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We study the evolution of wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in the
Netherlands for the years 1969-2020. Our analysis is based on estimates of the production
structure in the Netherlands, projections of the relative supply of skilled workers, and projections
regarding shifts in relative demand for skilled workers. Wage inequality will increase under
plausible assumptions because relative demand for skilled workers will increase more rapidly
than the relative supply of skilled workers. We study the potential of education subsidies to
higher education in order to stimulate the supply of skilled workers thereby off-setting the
projected increase in wage inequality. Our ﬁndings suggest that education subsidies are not very
effective in combating increases in wage inequality.
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561 Introduction
The Netherlands experienced decreasing wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers
in recent decades (see Hartog, Oosterbeek and, Teulings, 1993). The dominant explanation for
this diminished inequality is that the supply of skilled workers, notably higher educated women,
increased substantially. Increasing the supply of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers
will result in less wage inequality because workers with different skill levels are imperfect
substitutes in production.
At the same time, labour demand becomes increasingly more skill intensive as a consequence
of shifts in relative demand for skilled workers, notably due to technological changes. Leuven
and Oosterbeek (2000) have shown that the skill premium has been increasing in recent years.
This recent development suggests that the race between schooling and technology is being lost
by schooling, to put it in Tinbergen’s (1975) terminology.
The ﬁrst question of this paper is whether the race between technology and schooling is
indeed lost by schooling. To answer this question, we estimate a reduced form of a
macroeconomic production function à la Katz and Murphy (1992) in order to determine the
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers and the shifts in relative demand
for skilled workers. Our ﬁndings are consistent with earlier ﬁndings in the literature. Using
projections on the future relative supplies of skilled workers, we make a prediction of the
evolution of wage inequality in years to come. We come to the conclusion that, under plausible
assumptions, and without any changes in policy, wage inequality will increase substantially in
coming years.
The second question is whether education policies, i.e., the increase of publicly ﬁnanced
education subsidies, can be used as an instrument in reducing wage inequality as suggested by
Tinbergen (1975) and, more recently, Teulings (2000). The latter author argues that education
subsidies are an efﬁcient means to meet redistributional ends. We use our model to compute the
necessary increase in the stock of skilled workers to keep wage-inequality at its current level.
Given some presumed enrolment elasticities, we calculate the reduction in tuition costs required
to increase the stock of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers. We suggest that stimulation
of the supply of skilled workers is probably a very expensive and therefore ineffective policy in
reducing wage inequality. We also discuss some factors that may further reduce the scope of
education policy as a redistributive device. We argue that it is doubtful whether education
subsidies really have the strong potential of reducing wage inequality as has been suggested.
The set-up of this paper is as follows. First, in section 2 we review the literature on education
and inequality in order to position the paper. In section 3 we review some empirical work for the
Netherlands. In section 4 we set up a small theoretical model to disentangle the various factors
that inﬂuence wage inequality and to derive our estimating equation. In section 5 we estimate a
macroeconomic production function with skilled and unskilled labour. We make predictions of
7wage inequality in section 6. In section 7 we analyse the role of education policy in reducing
wage inequality. Section 8 contains some arguments that weaken the case for education
subsidies for redistributional purposes. And, ﬁnally, section 9 is devoted to the conclusions. An
appendix contains some theoretical derivations.
82 Education and wage inequality
Wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers has increased in many industrialised
countries. Especially the US and the UK have experienced dramatic increases of the skill
premium. Similar but less dramatic stories can be told for many European countries (Davis,
1992). Apparently, the steady increase of the relative supply of skilled workers, which
compresses wage differentials, has been more than off-set by the increase in relative demand,
which increases wage differentials. The economic literature has given a number of explanations
for this phenomenon.
The ﬁrst, and most dominant explanation for the rise in wage inequality is so called
skill-biased technological change (see Katz and Murphy, 1992; Bound and Johnson, 1992; and
Berman, Bound and Grilliches, 1994). Skilled workers are more complementary with new
technologies than unskilled workers. Consequently, new technologies increase the relative
demand for skilled workers. There is suggestive evidence that especially the ICT revolution has
caused an increase of the skill premium (Krueger, 1993; Autor et al., 1998).
Secondly, increasing international trade, in particular trade with low-wage countries, also
offers an explanation for the increased relative demand for skilled workers. The reason is that
countries with an abundance of skilled workers will specialize in skill intensive production,
whereas low wage countries specialize in labour intensive production. As a direct consequence,
relative labour demand for skilled workers increases in the highly developed countries. The
empirical importance of international trade to explain increasing wage inequality is strongly
disputed however because of the limited volume of international trade (see Wood, 1994; Borjas
and Ramey, 1995; Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; and the discussions in Krugman, 1993; and
Nahuis, 2000).
Thirdly, some recent studies hint at capital skill complementarity, i.e., higher educated
workers are more complementary to capital than unskilled workers. This implies that the relative
demand for skilled workers increases with the capital intensity of the economy, analogously to
skill-biased technical change (Goldin and Katz, 1995; Krussell et al., 2000; and Beaudry and
Green, 2000). The question still remains whether capital-skill complementarity is indeed
empirically relevant, because it is difﬁcult to disentangle from skill-biased technological change.
Furthermore, explaining rising wage inequality with capital skill complementarity seems
difﬁcult to reconcile with a constant capital share in output (see Heckman et. al, 1998).
Fourthly, changes in labour market institutions may have contributed to increases in overall
wage inequality. Lower minimum wages and erosion of union power have caused an increase in
wage inequality in the US (DiNardo et al., 1996; Lee, 1999; Teulings, 2003). A number of
institutional changes have occurred as well in the Netherlands. These may have contributed to
increases in wage inequality, e.g., the freezes in minimum wages and beneﬁts and its associated
lowering of the replacement rate which has eroded union power. Other examples are reforms in
9welfare, unemployment, and disability beneﬁts. The growing importance of part-time jobs and
ﬂexible labour contracts have also have put pressure on the wage setting power of unions.
Labour market institutions may further explain why wage inequality has not been rising so much
in most European countries compared to the US. Skill-biased labour demand shifts do not result
in larger wage inequality, but in higher unemployment rates amongst the low-skilled if
low-skilled workers’ incomes are protected by for example minimum wages, strong unions,
strong labour market regulations, and so on. See for example Krugman (1995) and David (1998)
for the effects of skill-biased labour demand shifts due to increased international trade in the
presence of minimum wages.
Although (changes in) labour market institutions may have mattered for overall wage
inequality, one has to be careful in drawing ﬁrm conclusions on the role of institutions for wage
inequality. The reason is that institutional changes may well have been triggered by changed
labour market conditions. Many institutional reforms in the Netherlands were to a large extent a
response to high unemployment rates in the 80’s. Katz and Autor (1999, p.1547) note:
“Institutions that go strongly against market forces face a difﬁcult task”. This view ﬁnds ample
empirical support by Leuven et al. (2000). The latter authors ﬁnd that the standard labour
market model of supply and demand works very well empirically to explain differences in wage
inequality for a large number of developed countries.1
Furthermore, a number of authors suggest that the relative supply of skilled workers has
actually been decreasing in the US, rather than increasing as a consequence of the ageing of the
population, lower fertility rates and the inﬂow of low-skilled migrants (Katz and Murphy, 1992;
Murphy and Welch, 1992; and Borjas et al., 1997). These developments also increase wage
inequality.
Not all wage inequality can attributed to differences between different skill groups. One can
see a steady increase in wage inequality within groups of workers with similar skills as well.
Further, sectoral shifts in employment have stimulated relative demand for skilled labour.
Nevertheless, Katz and Autor (1999) concluded for the US that only a third of overall wage
inequality can be attributed to gender, education and experience. The bulk of wage inequality
remains unexplained and can not be attributed to observed skill, experience, sector of
employment, etc. Skill-biased technological change is therefore regarded as the major candidate
to explain this residual wage inequality.2
1 Moreover, Leuven et al. (2000) cast doubt on the ﬁndings by Blau and Kahn (1996) who suggested that institutions are
the main force driving international differences in wage inequality.
2 One may perhaps draw a parallel to the literature on economic growth where the so called Solow residual is the most
important ingredient for economic growth, but remains unexplained.
103 Inequality in the Netherlands
The evolution of wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers has been somewhat
different in the Netherlands compared to the Anglo-Saxon countries. Firstly, as often suggested,
because the institutional setting of the labour market is different compared to other countries.
Secondly, and probably more importantly, because the relative supply of skilled workers has
increased tremendously in contrast to for example the US.
Stegeman and Waaijers (2000, p.11) present the following ‘stylised facts’ for evolution of
wage inequality in the Netherlands:
• Overall wage inequality increased in the 80’s, decreased little at the beginning of the 90’s, and
increased slightly towards the end to the 90’s.
• Wage differentials between men and women increased in the 80’s and decreased in the 90’s.
• Wage differentials between older and younger workers increased sharply in the 80’s and
decreased slightly in the 90’s.
• Young workers with lower education started to earn relatively less compared to young workers
with higher education in the 80’s (expansion of wage differentials). The 90’s show the opposite
pattern (wage compression).
• Old workers with higher education faced declining wages compared to old workers with lower
education (wage compression).
• Within group wage inequality has increased during the 80’s and remained stable during the 90’s.
Stegeman and Waaiers (2000) have two main explanations for the changes in the Dutch wage
structure. First, the increase in skilled labour supply of predominantly female workers. Second,
(general) skill-biased technological change. Sectoral shifts and labour demand effects only
played a minor role.
Findings by Hartog et al. (1993), Leuven and Oosterbeek (2000) and Smits et al. (2001) are
consistent with the stylised facts sketched above. In all these studies the private returns to
education are estimated and compared over time. The private return measures the percentage
increase in wages that results from an additional year of schooling. Therefore, the private return
to education is a measure of inequality between workers with different skills: the higher the
return, the larger the income differentials between groups of workers with different levels of
schooling. The aforementioned authors ﬁnd that the private return to education is about 11% at
the beginning of the 60’s, then steadily declines to about 7% in the 80’s, stabilises in the early
90’s, and increases again at the end of the 90’s to about 8-9% in recent years.
11124 A model of wage inequality
This section presents a small theoretical model of the labour market with two types of workers
that is the basis of our empirical model used later on in this paper. We relate wage inequality3 to
the supplies of low and high-skilled workers and to the developments in the demands for low and
high-skilled workers. We assume perfect competition in labour and product markets. Workers of
different skill are imperfect substitutes in production. We allow for skill-biased technical change
and capital skill complementarity. Our set-up allows us to highlight the main determinants of
wage inequality as discussed above.
Let production be designated by the following constant returns to scale production function
F(.):
Y(t) = A(t)F(K(t),S(t)H(t),L(t)), (4.1)
whereY, A, S, K, H, L, and t stand for output, an index for Hicks-neutral technological change, a
speciﬁc index for skill-biased technical change, the capital stock, the number of high-skilled
workers, the number of low-skilled workers and time, respectively. Following Krussell et al.
(2000), we assume that high-skilled labour and capital are nested in the aggregate production
function with a constant returns sub-production function G(.), dropping the time indices for
convenience:
Y = AF(L,G(K,SH)). (4.2)
We impose the restriction that the elasticity of substitution between capital and low-skilled
labour equals the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour (σ). According
to Krussell et al. (2000) this is consistent with empirical ﬁndings for the US. The elasticity of
substitution between capital and skilled labour is denoted ρ. If σ > ρ, skilled labour is more
complementary to capital than unskilled labour.
Perfect competition and constant returns to scale imply that all workers receive their
marginal product as wages. Let wH and wL denote the wages of skilled and unskilled workers.








To ﬁnd the determinants of wage inequality we (log-)linearise the last equation around an
initial equilibrium. This results in the following expression for the change in wage inequality



































3 From here on, we use the short-cut wage inequality to denote wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers.
13where a tilde (‘˜’) denotes a percentage change in a variable, e.g., ˜ π ≡ dπ/π.
ω ≡ (∂G/∂H)SH/G(.) is the income share of high-skilled labour income in the sum of wage
payments to high-skilled workers and rental payments to capital owners.
The three terms in equation 4.4 have an intuitive interpretation. The ﬁrst term gives the
standard substitution effect on wages that arises from changes in the relative supply of skilled
workers. Increasing the supply of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers (˜ L− ˜ H < 0) will
result in less wage inequality because workers with different skill levels are imperfect substitutes
in production. If ﬁrms cannot perfectly substitute the increase in supply of skilled workers for
unskilled skilled workers, productivity of skilled (unskilled) workers falls (increases) and wage
inequality diminishes. If workers are perfect substitutes in production, σ = ¥, increases relative
supplies of skilled workers (˜ L− ˜ H < 0) do not affect wage inequality. We would get a similar
result if relative wages are determined in world factor markets. One could also interpret σ = ¥
as a small open economy with perfect factor price equalisation. Moreover, increased
internationalisation may be viewed as an increase in σ. Wage inequality increases as a
consequence.
The second term in equation 4.4 denotes the effect on wage inequality of skill-biased
technical change (˜ S > 0). Skill-biased technical change results in rising wage inequality because
productivity of skilled workers increases relative to unskilled workers.
The last term in equation 4.4 measures the effect of capital skill complementarity on wage
inequality. An increase in the capital stock ( ˜ K > 0) increases wage inequality because
productivity of skilled labour increases relative to unskilled labour.4 Most analyses hint at
skill-biased technical change as the major reason for increases in wage inequality, but equation
4.4 shows that this may also be due to unmeasured capital skill complementarity. Krussell et al.
(2000) argue that unmeasured trend effects may simply be serving as a proxy for omitted
capital-skill complementarity.
A remark on the clearing of the labour markets is in order here. One may argue that
minimum wages ﬁx the wage rates for the unskilled workers. Therefore, increases in the supply
of unskilled workers do not affect wage-inequality, but raises unemployment among the
unskilled. However, for the long-run we are inclined to think that wages for low-skilled workers
are indeed ﬂexible. If this was not the case, one should observe that the number of unemployed
unskilled workers would be steadily increasing over time as the supply of unskilled workers
increases. Casual observation suggests that this is implausible. If labour demand for skilled
workers keeps up with supply of skilled workers, then minimum wages are not a binding
restriction in the demand for low-skilled workers.
Katz and Murphy (1992) based their analysis on a CES production function without capital
4 If we have a Cobb-Douglas production function, then ρ = σ = 1, and there is no capital skill complementarity.
14skill complementarity, i.e., F(K,SH,L), and σ = ρ.5 They further assume a linear time-trend in






















γ . Katz and Murphy (1992) estimate the last equation on US data using a time
series for the period 1963-1987 and obtain the following:
logπ = −.709log(H/L)+.033t +c. (4.6)
From this follows that the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers
σ = 1.41 and the rate at which demand shifts relative labour demand increases wage inequality
equals 3.3% per year.
Note that it is in general hard to discriminate between the various causes of wage inequality.
Both increased skill-biased technological change, capital skill complementarity and international
trade will affect relative demands for skilled workers and thereby the estimated trend in relative
labour demand. In our analysis below we do not attempt to disentangle the various causes. We
focus on the aggregate shifts in relative demand for skilled labour. The speciﬁcation of our
estimation equation is based on Katz and Murphy (1992).
5 The equation for changes in wage inequality 4.4, becomes: ˜ π = 1
σ
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15165 Data and analysis
We base our analysis on labour statistics (‘Arbeidsrekeningen’) for the period 1969-1996
collected by CBS (1999).6 We only use aggregate data because estimation of the elasticity of
substitution between skilled and unskilled workers on sectoral level gave implausibly high
values. The reason for this ﬁnding is probably that sectoral wage differentials are importantly
determined by relative supplies of skilled workers throughout the economy. Workers can move
relatively easy from one sector to another when there are large wage differentials between
sectors. Arbitrage on the labour market ensures that relative wages in all sectors are equalised.7
Data are available for four levels of education: workers with primary education (or less),
workers with secondary general education, workers with secondary vocational education and
workers with either higher vocational or university education. We use two skill groups: lower
and higher educated workers. Lower educated workers are all workers with primary or
secondary education. Higher educated workers are all workers with higher education.8
Our measure for relative supply of skilled workers is simply the ratio of the number of skilled
and unskilled workers. We use total labour years, rather than employed persons, as a measure for
the supply of each skill group. This is a correct measure for effective labour supply and avoids
problems with the number of hours worked. The drawback of this measure is that labour years
are sensitive to the business cycle, whereas, for example, total persons in the labour force is not.
To check whether business effects are important, we also estimated our regression equation with
relative supplies of skilled workers based on the number of persons in the labour force, but this
affected our estimates only marginally.9
Wage inequality measures are based on gross hourly wages. Relative wages are deﬁned as
the ratio of hourly wage rates of skilled and unskilled workers. Wage rates of aggregate skill
groups are based on weighted wage rates of the various sub-groups. The relative number of
labour years have been used as weights.
Because of the short time-series available, it is econometrically impossible to allow for a
ﬁner disaggregation in skill groups or to allow for the capital stock. Any additional variables
would severely limit the reliability of the estimations, as was the case in previous Dutch
analyses. For example, Hebbink (1991) estimates 9 or more parameters using a data set
6 Data for more recent years were not yet available at the time of this research. Data are available upon request.
7 It may be that econometric problems were encountered in earlier Dutch studies because sectoral data were used, see,
e.g., Hebbink (1991), Draper and Manders (1996) and Stegeman and Waaiers (2000).
8 Other ways of aggregating skill groups did not affect our results. Katz and Murphy (1992) take weighted supplies within
each aggregate skill group where weights are deﬁned as the fraction of time-series averages of wages for each subgroup
and average wages within each skill group. A similar procedure can be applied to compute the relative wages within each
skill group, i.e., by weighting with average labour supplies of each skill group with averages of the aggregate. Some form
of the ‘Cambridge’ controversy is relevant here because, for example, the weights for weighting supplies (wages) are
determined by the supplies themselves.
9 Results are available upon request.
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containing only 48 observations. We note here that Katz and Murphy (1992) also estimate their
equation using 25 observations.
Aggregate time-series of the relative supply and wages of skilled workers (in logs) are given
in ﬁgure 5.1. The strong increase in the relative supply of skilled workers is striking. Average
growth in relative supply of skilled workers was 4.1% per year in the period 1969-1996. The
wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers decreased at an average rate of 1.1% per
year in the same period.
At ﬁrst sight, these time-series suggest that there must have been substantial shifts in relative
demand for skilled workers to absorb the growth in supply of skilled workers, since differentials
decreased at a much slower pace than the relative supply of skilled workers increased.
The data strongly suggest that the time-series are not stationary, which may cause estimation
problems. Indeed, ADF-tests on both relative supplies and relative wages indicate that the
presence of a unit-root cannot be rejected.10 We obtain consistent estimates of our parameters
only when the estimating equation is co-integrated. We applied ADF-statistics on the residuals
in our estimations to test for co-integration, i.e., the null-hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals
must be rejected.
10 Results are available upon request.










where c is a constant, g denotes a (linear) time-trend which measures shifts in growth of relative
demand and σ is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers. Table 5.1
shows the estimation results.
Table 5.1 Estimation results elasticity of substitution and relative demand shifts
g − 1
σ σ p-coint.a R2
ad j N
Not restricted - -.253*** 4 .61 .88 28
(.017)
Not restricted -.0112** .0158 -63 .86 .89 28
(.0053) (.13)
Fixed g
g = .01 - -.492*** 2.0 .29 .95 28
(.021)
g = .02 - -.731*** 1.4 .13 .97 28
(.025)
g = .03 - -.970*** 1.0 .09* .97 28
(.031)
g = .04 - -1.12*** .8 .07* .98 28
(.036)
Fixed σ
σ = .5 .0716*** - .02** .98 28
(.0023)
σ = 1 .0305*** - .04** .95 28
(.0013)
σ = 1.5 .0168*** - .10* .91 28
(.0010)
σ = 2 .00995*** - .22 .82 28
(.00088)
σ = 2.5 .00584*** - .35 .65 28
(.00082)
σ = 3 .00310*** - .46 .35 28
(.00078)
Note: *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level, ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level, standard errors in parenthesis.
aTest for co-integration based on the MacKinnon p-value for rejection of the null-hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals using an
ADF-statistic without a trend or lags.
Direct estimation of equation 5.1 gives non-signiﬁcant results for both the substitution elasticity
and the time-trend. Moreover, both the estimates for the elasticity of substitution and the
time-trend have the wrong sign. The statistical reason for this result is that the time-trend is
highly collinear with the growth in relative supply of skilled workers (correlation coefﬁcient
19.99). Figure 5.1 conﬁrms that relative supply increases almost linearly through time.11
As suggested by Katz and Murphy (1992), we proceed by ﬁxing the time-trend on a plausible
value and estimate the elasticity of substitution, and vice versa. This allows us to investigate
whether the Dutch date are consistent with empirically plausible values of both parameters
encountered in the literature.
Table 5.2 gives an overview of estimated substitution elasticities as well as the estimated
time-trends where available. Generally, elasticities are found to lie in the interval (1;3), cf.
Freeman (1986), and Katz and Autor (1999) for overviews of the empirical literature. Freeman
(1986, p.366) draws the conclusion: “All told, the current evidence suggest a value of the
elasticity of substitution between more and less educated labour in the range 1.0-2.0.” Katz and
Autor’s (1999) reading of the literature also suggests a value around 1.5. Insofar as time-trends
have been estimated, the coefﬁcients imply a value of the annual growth rate in relative wages of
around 3%.
Table 5.2 Overview of estimates of elasticity of substitution and relative demand shifts
Study Country Data σ g
Welch (1970)a US CS s 1.4
Johnson (1970) US CS s 1.3
Dougherty (1972) US CS s 8.2
Psacharopoulos et al.b (1972) var. CS c 1000
Psacharopoulos et al.c (1972) var. CS c 2.1 – 2.5
Tinbergen (1974) var. CS c .6 – 1.2
Layard and Fallon (1986) var. CS c .6 – 3.5
Hebbink (1991) NL TS 0 – 1.2 -.06 – -.13
Katz and Murphy (1992) US TS 1.41 .033
Bound and Johnson (1992) US P m 1.7
Schmitt (1995) UK TS m 3.4
Kim and Topel (1995) S. Korea TS m 3.7 – 4.2 .033 – .002
Edin and Holmlund (1995) Sweden TS m 2.9 .008 – .011
Draper and Manders (1996) NL P s 1.53 – 3.01 .03
Heckman et al. (1998) US SM m 1.44 .036
Murphy et al. (1998) Canada TS m 1.37
Krussel et al. (2000) US SM m 1.67
Stegeman and Waaijers (2000) NL P m 8
Note: CS stands for cross section, TS for time-series, P for panel, SM for structural model, s denotes state-level data, c denotes country-




11 This may be another reason why the Dutch studies faced problems in estimating the elasticity of substitution.
20The Dutch study by Draper and Manders (1996) ﬁnds plausible estimates. However, studies by
Hebbink (1991), and Stegeman and Waaijers (2000) are subject to estimation problems and
therefore provide little robust evidence as to what the elasticity of substitution or the time trend
is. Hebbink (1991) ﬁnds an implausibly large negative value of the rate of skill-biased technical
change and very low elasticities of substitution. Stegeman and Waaijers ﬁnd a very high value of
the elasticity of substitution and do not estimate the rate of skill-biased technical change.
First, we ﬁx the time-trend at values of 1, 2, 3, and 4% per year. Estimates found in earlier
studies are covered in this range of values. Estimation results for the elasticity of substitution –
all statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level – imply that the coefﬁcient lies exactly in the range of
ﬁndings from the international literature. Our estimates of the elasticity of substitution range
from .8 to 2.0.
If we ﬁx the elasticity of substitution at plausible values between .5 and 3, and estimate the
coefﬁcient for the time-trend, we also ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant estimates for the time-trend in
the order of .3 to 7.2% per year. This is also in the ball-park of earlier ﬁndings, cf. Table 5.2.
If the elasticity of substitution is smaller than 2 or if the time trend in labour supply is larger
than .02, we ﬁnd that the regression equations are indeed (nearly) co-integrated for the most
plausible parameter values. In order to gain more conﬁdence in our estimations, we also
estimated the regression equation in ﬁrst-differences.12 Again, simultaneous estimation of the
elasticity of substitution and the time-trend produce implausible coefﬁcients. However,
estimations in ﬁrst-differences when the trend or the elasticity of substitution is ﬁxed, give very
similar coefﬁcients as the levels speciﬁcation, which is a reassuring ﬁnding.
Although this analysis has some shortcomings caused by the strong multicollinearity
between relative supply of skilled workers and the growth rate in relative demand for skilled
workers, we can at least conclude that our estimations, while ﬁxing one of the parameters at
plausible values, produce values of the other coefﬁcients that are considered to be amongst the
most reasonable values found in the literature. Therefore, the rest of the analysis is based on
three speciﬁcations for the macro-economic production function consistent with the data:
1. σ = 1.4 and g = .02.
2. σ = 2.0 and g = .01.
3. σ = 1.0 and g = .03.
The ﬁrst is our ‘best guess’ scenario with an elasticity of substitution suggested by most authors
and a time-trend which is somewhat lower than found in most US studies. Eden and Holmstrum
(1995) ﬁnd a trend of 1% per year for Sweden, a country whose labour market conditions are
probably more similar to the Netherlands than the US. The other two scenario’s are based on a
12 Results are available upon request.
21low trend in relative demand shifts and a high elasticity of substitution, and vice versa.
The goodness of ﬁt as measured by the R2
ad j from the estimation equations are quite high in
our scenarios, ranging from .95 to .97. We plotted in ﬁgure 5.2 the actual development in wage
inequality and the development in wage inequality as predicted by our scenarios, in order to get
an idea to what extent our model approaches reality. The model of relative supply and demand
predicts quite well after 1980. Before 1980, however, the ﬁt is not too good. We have checked
whether this result could be traced to the fact that we used the relative supply of labour years
rather than relative labour supply in persons. This was not the case. Also projections based on
relative supply measured in persons showed the same pattern before 1980. Furthermore, one can
argue that especially low-skilled workers were hit by unemployment during the years of the oil
crises. This would imply that relative supplies of skilled workers would have gone up in these
years and predicted wage inequality should have decreased even further. Consequently, allowing
for employment effects would have increased the observed gap between predicted and actual
wage differentials. We further checked whether omitting the years 1969-1974 gave different
estimates. This turned out not to be the case.
































log wage differential prediction sigma=1, g=.03
prediction sigma=1.4, g=.02 prediction sigma=2, g=.01
One may also question the appropriateness of using a linear time-trend to measure relative
demand shifts. In ﬁgure 5.3 we plotted the time-series of implied demand shifts for the period
1969-1996, based on an assumed elasticity of substitution equal to 1.4. Given the fact that
22relative supply of skilled workers increases almost linearly through time, it is not surprising that
the trend in relative demand shifts is also approximately linear. We checked whether there are
non-linearities in the time-trend by regressing the differences between implied demand shifts
(based on an elasticity of substitution equal to 1.4) and predicted demand shifts (based on a
linear trend) on the time-trend. Estimates are not signiﬁcant at conventional levels, so that we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the time-trend is linear.
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23246 Wage differentials in the Netherlands 2000-2020
Projections on the development of supplies of workers with different levels of education are
given in CBS/CPB (1997). In this study we use an update of these data made available by
CPB.13 Data are only available on the number of employable people in the labour force. We
make predictions of the future development in wage inequality based on our three speciﬁcations
of the production structure.
We have to make two assumptions in our predictions. First, we assume that the developments
in the relative supply of labour years are comparable to the development in the number of
employable workers in the work force. However, participation rates will probably increase faster
for low-skilled than for high-skilled workers because low-skilled workers are lagging behind
with respect to hours worked and participation rates. Therefore, we may overestimate the growth
in effective relative skilled labour supply in labour years.
Second, we assume that the growth in the relative supply of skilled workers is exogenous.14
This implies that relative supply of skilled labour is not affected by relative wages. Only an
advanced general equilibrium model, where the supply side of the labour market is based on
individually optimising behaviour with regard to investments in human capital, can tackle the
consequences of changes in relative wages on incentives for skill-formation. This is beyond the
scope of this paper, but see for example Heckman et al. (1998a, 1998b) for an application. We
discuss this assumption later in more detail.
Figure 6.1 shows the development of the relative supply of skilled workers in the period
1969-2020.15 Relative supply of skilled workers increases to about 39% in 2000 and stabilises
around 44% in 2020. In other words, the average growth rate of the relative supply of skilled
workers falls from 4.1% per year in the period 1969-2020 to a modest 0.6% per year in
2000-2020. Consequently, there will be a strong decline in the growth rate of relative supply of
skilled labour.
In ﬁgure 6.2 we plotted the predicted wage differentials between skilled and unskilled
workers for the various parameter values regarding the trends and elasticities of substitution. We
harmlessly normalised the initial (log) wage differential in 2000 at zero, since we do not have a
value of wage inequality in 2000. This is also convenient since any log differences at later dates
can be interpreted as percentage changes relative to 2000. The ﬁgure shows that the increase in
relative supply of skilled workers will not be sufﬁcient in reducing future wage inequality. Wage
inequality will increase 14% in the scenario with the lowest presumed trend in relative demand
13 Data are available upon request from the author.
14 This assumption was also made in the construction of the time-series.
15 We made a correction for the break in the time-series by adjusting the initial level of the second time-series to the level
of the ﬁrst. The ﬁrst-time-series has been extrapolated with the average growth rate in relative supply of skilled workers
(0.6% per year) in 1997-2000. In later calculations we use CBS/CPB projections.































for skilled workers. Relative wages increase 31% in the base line scenario. And, wage
differentials increases 48% in the scenario with the highest growth in relative demand for skilled
workers. It is easily established that the bulk of the increase in wage inequality can be attributed
to skill-biased labour demand shifts and only a minor part can be attributed to substitution of
skilled for unskilled workers. Table 6.1 breaks down the increase in wage inequality in increases
in relative demand and in substitution effects.
Table 6.1 Decomposition wage inequality 2000-2020
Trend Substitution Total
g = .02, σ = 1.4 .40 -.09 .31
g = .01, σ = 2.0 .20 -.06 .14
g = .03, σ = 1.0 .60 -.12 .48
To check for robustness, we also made projections on developments in wage inequality for a
‘worst case’ and a ‘best case’ scenario. In the ‘worst case scenario’, the elasticity of substitution
and the time-trend in demand have been set relatively high, but not at extreme levels that are
found in the literature, i.e., σ = 2 and g = .03. The elasticity of substitution may increase due to,






























prediction sigma=1.4, g=.02 prediction sigma=2, g=.01 prediction sigma=1, g=.03
for example, increased international trade, whereas a higher rate of growth in relative demand
for skilled workers may reﬂect an acceleration in the rate of skill-biased technical change. In the
‘best case scenario’, both parameters have been set at lowest values that seem reasonable, i.e.,
σ = 1 and g = .01.
Ideally, we would like to provide conﬁdence intervals for our predictions, but the true
standard error of our estimations is unknown since we ﬁxed one of the parameters in the
estimations. Nevertheless, we can get some idea on the prediction intervals for the individually
estimated parameters. If the estimated coefﬁcient for σ is about 1.4 and the partial standard error
for the estimates of 1/σ = 1/1.4 equals at most .036 (see table 5.1), the 99% conﬁdence interval
for σ would be σ ∈ [1.2;1.7]. Similarly, for the time trend, for a value of g = .02 and a standard
error of at most .0023 (see table 5.1) we would obtain a 99% conﬁdence interval for g
∈ [.01;.03]. Therefore, our worst and best case scenarios probably cover the upper and lower
bounds of parameters quite reasonably.
Figure 6.3 presents both cases. At best, wage inequality will diminish in the short-run, but
will increase in the long run. In the worst case, wage inequality will increase tremendously
leading to an increase of the wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers of about
55% in 2020.
To summarise, it is very likely that wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers
will increase in years to come. The reason is that the growth rate in relative supply slows will































prediction sigma=1, g=.01 prediction sigma=2, g=.03
down to a rate of only 0.6% per year. This will not be sufﬁcient to meet the increase in relative
demand resulting in growth in wage inequality of at least at 1% per year under most plausible
circumstances. Therefore, one may conclude that the race between schooling and technology is
lost by schooling.
287 Education policy to reduce inequality
Tinbergen (1975) and Teulings (2000) argue that there is a role for the government in reducing
wage inequality by means of education subsidies. The argument is based on the idea that
increasing the incentives to enrol in higher education, stimulates the relative supply of skilled
workers, and reduces wage inequality as a consequence. If equity is valued in society, then there
is a possibility for the government to use education policies in reducing wage inequality.
In this section we show to what extent the government can indeed contribute to a reduction in
wage inequality by means of education subsidies. Firstly, we compute the increase in the stock
of skilled workers needed to keep wage inequality constant. Secondly, we derive the necessary
yearly increase in the ﬂow of skilled workers to the labour market. Thirdly, we calculate the
required reduction in tuition costs in order to boost the supply of skilled workers.
A natural point of reference is to take the current amount of wage inequality as a measure for
the desired amount of income inequality. According to Becker’s (1983) efﬁcient redistribution
hypothesis, policies would have changed if they did not meet current political demands for
redistribution. Suppose that the government considers education policy to keep wage inequality
constant, how much should the relative demand for skilled workers increase to keep wage
inequality at its current level?
The answer can easily be obtained by totally differentiating the estimated equation for wage
inequality:




















In other words, the percentage increase in the relative supply of skilled workers is linear in the
elasticity of substitution, the growth in relative demand for skilled workers, and the length of the
time period under consideration.
We can compute the increase in relative supplies of skilled workers in order to keep wage
inequality constant in the next 20 years for the various scenarios, see table 7.1. The current
relative supply of skilled workers will increase from .39 to .44 in 2020. If we confront the
predicted relative supply of skilled workers with the relative supply of skilled workers necessary
to keep wage inequality constant, the relative supply of skilled workers has to increase with
11%-points in the most favourable case, and has to increase with 18%-points in the most
unfavourable case.
Consequently, the relative number of skilled workers has to increase at least 25% and at most
with 41% relative to the situation in 2020. The average growth rate of relative supply of skilled
29Table 7.1 Calculations of increase in relative supply of skilled workers
Required Prediction Difference Difference Required
H/L H/L (%-points) (%) growth (%)
g = .02, σ = 1.4 .61 .44 17 39 2.2
g = .01, σ = 2.0 .55 .44 11 25 1.7
g = .03, σ = 1.0 .62 .44 18 41 2.3
Note: the time period is 20 years (dt = 20) and the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers in 2000 is H/L = .39.
workers must increase from .6% per year to 2.2%, 1.7%, or 2.3% per year, respectively.
Therefore, the growth rate of relative supply of skilled workers needs to double at least, and
quadruple at most, in the period 2000-2020 in order to keep wage inequality constant. Recall
that these growth rates are always lower than the growth in relative supply of skilled workers that
occurred in recent decades (4.1% per year).
A qualiﬁcation is in order here because these numbers do of course depend critically on the
accuracy of the predictions by CBS/CPB (1997). Since standard errors of the predictions are not
available, we cannot assess the extent to which these numbers are sensitive to uncertainties
involved in the future development of the relative supply of skilled workers.16
Education policy allows the government to increase the number of skilled workers in the
labour force. However, education policies only affect the stock of skilled workers indirectly. The
reason is that stimulating skill formation only affects the inﬂow of younger age cohorts that
become higher educated as a result of the policy.
We do not only have projections for 2000-2020 on the relative number of skilled and
unskilled workers in the labour force, but also on the in- and outﬂows of workers in the labour
force. This allows us to compute the percentage increase in the inﬂow of higher educated
workers to the labour market that is necessary to increase the stock of skilled workers so as to
keep wage inequality at current levels.
To that end we propose a highly stylised labour market model of ﬂows. Let Ht and Lt denote
the number of high and low-skilled workers at time t. In every year there is an inﬂow of higher
and lower educated workers, IHt and ILt. There is an outﬂow of older workers (OHt and OLt)
from the labour force as a consequence of retirement, mortality, etc. The stocks of higher and
lower educated workers at time t +1 are now given by:
Ht+1 = Ht +IHt −OHt
Lt+1 = Lt +ILt −OLt (7.3)
The relative supply of skilled workers at time t is now given through backward iterating the last
16 The projections by CBS/CPB (1997) do consider three scenario’s but the scenario’s only differ very little from each
other as regards the development of relative supply of skilled workers over time.











where Lo and Ho denote the given number of unskilled and skilled workers at time t = 0 (=
2000).
Suppose that we increase the inﬂow of skilled workers in the period 2000-2020 with a
constant fraction δ of all workers that ﬂow into the labour market, i.e., δ(ILt +IHt). The
increased inﬂow of skilled workers originates from a decrease in the inﬂow to the labour market
of unskilled workers. Therefore, the inﬂow of unskilled workers falls with fraction δ of the total
inﬂow of workers. The question is: how big must δ be to increase the inﬂow of skilled workers
so as to get the stock of relative supply of skilled workers at .61 instead of .44 in 2020 (for the

















Table 7.2 shows the results. Since δ is the increase in the inﬂow of higher educated workers to
the labour market, δ is approximately equal to the %-point increase in the fraction of each
birth-cohort that enters the labour market directly from college and university. Some
quantitatively less important factors may play a role such as an inﬂow to the labour market from
unemployment, migration, etc. From table 7.2 it follows that the fraction of skilled workers in
each birth cohort has to increase 10-15%-points every year in order to keep wage inequality
constant. The fraction of each birth cohort that graduated in higher education was 34.6% in 1998
(Ministry of Education, 2000, p.25). This implies that, if the outﬂow percentage was 35%, it has
to go up to 45-50%. In other words, about 45%-50% of each birth cohort should enter the labour
market in 1998 as a worker with higher education. In the future, this will have to be an even
larger number because the fraction of each birth cohort that graduates increases.
Table 7.2 Calculations of increase in the yearly inﬂow rate of skilled workers to the labour market
H/L2020 (%) δ(%)
g = .02, σ = 1.4 61 15
g = .01, σ = 2.0 55 10
g = .03, σ = 1.0 62 15
The effectiveness of education policy in reducing wage inequality critically hinges on the price
elasticity of enrolment. The more responsive enrolment is to reductions in educational costs, the
more potent is education policy in stimulating the relative supply of skilled workers. However,
empirical estimates of the price-elasticity of enrolment seem to suggest that the price
31responsiveness of enrolment in higher education is quite low. In table 7.3 we summarise the
ﬁndings on estimated enrolment elasticities that are found for Dutch and US studies.17
Table 7.3 Enrolment responses to increases in tuition costs and corresponding quasi elasticities
Study Data Typea Control Selection Sign.?b −dq dp/p e
Kodde (1985) NL CS Yes No - .0045 .5 .01
Oosterbeek et al. (1995) NL CS Yes No No 0 - 0
Kane (1994) US CS+TS Yes No Yes .05 .83 .06
Kane (1995) US CS+TS Yes No Yes .035 1.33 .03
Leslie et al. (1987) var. M - No - .006-.008 .029 .21 – .27
Hilmer (1998) US M Yes No Yes .01 .028 .36
Dynarksi (1999) US CS Yes Yes Yes .036 .10 .35 (.03)c
Heckman et al. (1998a) US SM, P Yes Yes Yes .08 .80d .07
Card et al. (2000) US CS+TS Yes No Yes - - .01 – .04
Cameron et al. (2001) US P Yes Yes Yes .03 – .06 .80d .02 – .05
Canton et al. (2002) NL TS No No No - - -.10 – .29e
Notes: ‘Control’ indicates whether estimations are done when controlling for background characteristics, IQ, and other individual charac-
teristics. ‘Selection’ indicates whether corrections are made for the selectivity of individuals enrolling in college (non-observed heterogen-
eity).
aCS=Cross-section; TS=Time-series; P=Panel; M=Meta analysis; SM=Structural model.
bIndicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level of the estimated coefﬁcient for tuition.
cPrice change relative to all costs of college including tuition, room and board. In parenthesis we show elasticity evaluated at average
tuition rates used by Cameron and Heckman (2001).
dPrice changes taken relative to an approximated weighted mean of 2 and 4 years tuition costs for Blacks, Hispanics and Whites in
Cameron and Heckman (2001) ($1250).
eQuasi-elasticity equals the directly estimated elasticity under the assumption that enrolment of eligible students in university education
is 100%. About 95% of all eligible students with pre-university education enrol, see Ministry of Education (2000).
Dutch ﬁndings imply an almost completely inelastic demand for higher education. Kodde (1985)
ﬁnds that doubling tuition costs results in a decline of enrolment of only 1%-point. Oosterbeek
and Webbink (1995) show that this effect is approximately zero. Kane’s ﬁndings for the US
suggest a relatively low price-elasticity of enrolment. Doubling tuition rates reduces enrolment
3-6%-points. However, Leslie and Brinkman (1987) ﬁnd a very high price-elasticity of
enrolment: doubling tuition rates will reduce enrolment rates a substantial 21-27%-points. This
has also been found in Hilmer (1998). However, both studies do not control for the selectivity of
enrolment in higher education. Non-observed individual characteristics may blur the estimates.
Three studies explicitly take into account the selectivity: Heckman, Lochner and Taber
(1998), Dynarski (1999), and Cameron and Heckman (1999). All studies ﬁnd roughly similar
estimates of a decrease between 3 and 8 percentage points in higher education when tuition costs
increase by $1000. The implied quasi elasticity of enrolment is 2-7% accordingly. The
difference between the elasticities of Dynarski and the others is that she evaluates the elasticity
17 The enrolment elasticity is deﬁned as the change in the enrolment rate in %-points divided by the percentage change in
prices, i.e., e = −dq/(dp/p).
32of enrolment at all costs, including board and room. The recent study by Card and Lemieux
(2000), without correcting for selectivity in enrolment, also ﬁnds that the elasticity is around
1-4% in the US. Canton and De Jong (2002) ﬁnd on Dutch data widely varying estimates of the
elasticity of enrolment between -10% and 29%. None of the Dutch estimates are statistically
signiﬁcant, however.
Based on all these considerations it seems reasonable to assume that the enrolment elasticity
in the Netherlands is somewhere between 0 and .1. We compute the required reduction in tuition
costs to induce the appropriate increase in supply of skilled workers for our three scenarios with
enrolment elasticities of .01, .03, .06 and .10, respectively. Table 7.4 shows the results.18
Table 7.4 Reductions in tuition rates
dq (%) dp/p (%) dp/p (%) dp/p (%) dp/p (%)
e = .01 e = .03 e = .06 e = .10
t = .02, σ = 1.4 15 1500 500 250 150
t = .01, σ = 2.0 10 1000 333 167 100
t = .03, σ = 1.0 15 1500 500 250 150
Enormous decreases in tuition costs are needed at very low Enrolment elasticities: 1000% or
more, i.e., ten times lower tuition rates. Still, very substantial decreases in tuition costs are
needed in the middle cases (e = .03, e = .06), in the order of 200% or more. Substantial
reductions in tuition costs are needed even at high enrolment elasticities: ﬁgures are always
above 100% or more. Tuition costs should therefore be abolished even in most favourable cases
to generate the increase in supply of skilled workers to keep wage inequality at its current level.
In less favourable cases, students have to be paid to enrol in higher education. Our tentative
calculations suggest that, even if our enrolment elasticities are only roughly plausible, that very
substantial reductions in tuition costs are necessary to increase the stock of skilled workers so as
to reduce wage inequality.
18 We make the assumption that the percentage change in the outﬂow from higher education equals the percentage
change in the inﬂow of higher educated to the labour market. This assumption is correct if drop-out rates remain constant.
33348 Factors that affect the effectiveness of education policies
So far, in the analysis a number of assumptions have been made that deserve further
examination. Relaxing the assumptions may strengthen or weaken the conclusions reached so
far. The effectiveness of education policies in reducing wage inequality can be affected in a
number of ways.
Firstly, under free trade, wage rates of workers with the same skills will converge to levels
that are determined on global, rather than local markets. Relative wages will then depend on the
global relative supplies of skilled workers and global relative demands for skilled workers, see
Topel (1999) and Katz and Autor (1999). Boosting the relative supply of skilled workers in a
small open economy, such as the Netherlands, will have a negligible effect on relative wages.
However, empirical work shows that perfect factor price equalisation is hard to establish. This
implies that education policies may be used in reducing inequality.
Secondly, some endogenous growth theories link the supply of skilled workers to the rate of
skill-biased technological change. An increase in the stock of skilled workers spurs R&D
activities that result in new technologies that are more complementary to skilled workers.
Consequently, stimulating skill formation with education subsidies will not only increase relative
supply of skilled workers, but also the relative demand for skilled workers. The tendency for
relative wages to fall is countered and this effect may be so strong that relative wages may even
increase in the long-run. Inequality may increase rather than decrease (Acemoglu, 1998; Kiley,
1999; Nahuis and Smulders, 2002). We did not pay attention to this interaction between
schooling and skill-biased technological change. If, however, this mechanism is indeed relevant,
then increasing the number of skilled workers has only a limited or no effect on wage inequality.
Moreover, if this interaction is empirically important, we also expect a slowing down of the rate
of skill-biased technological change if the growth rate of relative supply of skilled workers falls.
Thirdly, decreases in relative wages that are caused by increases in relative supplies will
reduce the incentives to invest in higher education. If agents are rational and forward looking,
they will anticipate that education policies will reduce the skill premium and they will reduce
their investments in human capital accordingly. Then, education subsidies loose their
effectiveness in reducing wage inequality. We assumed, however, that relative supplies of skilled
workers were exogenous. Heckman et al. (1998b) show that the general equilibrium effects on
relative wages may be so strong that the positive incentives generated by education subsidies
evaporate almost completely. Similarly, anticipated general equilibrium effects that increase the
skill-premium will increase incentives to acquire higher education. If these effects are indeed
relevant, then there will be less wage inequality than we predicted because we assumed that
relative supplies of skilled workers were exogenous.
Fourthly, subsidies on higher education are unequally distributed. The 50% richest
households receive about 80% of education subsidies, see SCP (1994). Furthermore, only the
35most talented parts of each birth cohort receive education subsidies because they learn most. We
did not take the unequal incidence effects into account in our calculations. On the one hand,
education subsidies compress wage differentials and thereby reduce inequality, but, on the other
hand, inequality increases because the subsidies are regressive. Dur and Teulings (2001) show
that both effects roughly cancel out, so that there is no net reduction in income inequality.
Fifthly, it is reasonable to presume that the distribution of academic potentials in the
population is bounded. Not everyone has sufﬁcient ability to pursue higher education. This
implies that it becomes increasingly more difﬁcult, and costly, to increase the stock of skilled
workers, because the potential number of higher educated persons is limited by the underlying
distribution of talent in the population. Stiglitz (1975, p.288) remarks: “The efﬁciency losses in
attempting to train a moron to become an engineer are obvious”.
Sixthly, trends and developments in labour markets may further undermine the potency of
education subsidies to reduce inequality. One may think of increased competitive pressures on
goods and labour markets, possibly facilitated through institutional reforms, further international
economic integration of industrialised countries, and the increase in mobility of factors of
production, all resulting in pressures towards more income inequality. It is conceivable that the
capital intensity of the Dutch economy increases. Older workers leave the labour market
whereas the stock of capital remains ﬁxed in the short-run. Wage inequality increases due to
capital-skill complementarity. Also the ICT revolution is associated with increases in wage
inequality. Since European countries have seen their productivity growth ﬁgures lagging behind
those of the US, an acceleration in skill-biased technical change may occur. Further, increased
pressure of migration typically increases the supply of low-skilled workers and may therefore
increase wage inequality. Labour mobility may also increase in the future. If skilled labour
becomes more mobile than unskilled labour, which is arguably the case, then wage inequality
increases if skilled labour becomes more scarce. Nevertheless, labour mobility is not very high
at the current moment, see also Nahuis et al. (2002). On the other hand, increases in future
participation rates and hours worked of the skilled workers, especially women, may counter
some increases in wage inequality because effective supply of skilled labour is increased. Also,
the upcoming ageing of the population may increase the demand of services that are typically
intensive in unskilled labour, thereby off-setting the trend in skill-biased labour demand.
All the trends towards internationalisation, increased mobility of factors of production,
higher capital intensity, skill-biased technological changes, and inﬂow of low-skilled migrants
will become more pronounced in the future. Both elasticities of substitution and trends in the
relative demands for skilled workers move towards the ‘worst case’ scenario discussed earlier.
The required increase in the stock of skilled workers to keep wage inequality constant will then
increase even further. Only increased labour force attachment of the unskilled, sectoral shifts
towards low-skilled production such as services, e.g. due to ageing, or a lower rate of
skill-biased technological progress may counter these trends.
369 Conclusion
This paper analyses wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. Although, wage
differentials have decreased in the last decades in the Netherlands, it has increased in recent
years. Apparently, growth in relative demand for skilled workers is overtaking the growth in
relative supply of skilled workers. Skill-biased technological change is the major candidate in
explaining these widening wage differentials.
We try to predict the evolution of wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in
2000-2020. To that end we attempt to substantiate our simulations with estimates of the
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers and the size of relative demand
shifts for skilled workers. Our empirical assessment conﬁrms ﬁndings from the literature.
Our predictions suggest that wage differentials will increase in the coming decades. Wages
of skilled workers will increase by about 10% relative to unskilled workers in the most
favourable case. If, however, developments are severely unfavourable to unskilled workers, wage
differentials may increase to 55%. In our base-line scenario, based on our best estimates of the
trend in relative demand and elasticity of substitution, wage differentials increase by about 30%.
We show that the increase in inequality is due to the strong slowdown of the growth rate in
skilled labour supply and the assumed continuation of relative demand shifts favouring skilled
labour. The projected growth rate of relative supply of skilled workers falls from 4.1% per year
in 1969-1996 to only 0.6% per year in 2000-2020. If assumed relative demand shifts cause a
steady increase in wage differentials of at least 1% per year, it is not surprising that wage
inequality will increase in years to come.
We show that education policy, i.e., reduction in tuition rates, is probably a very ineffective
instrument to counter increasing wage inequality. The reason is threefold. Firstly, very
substantial increases in the inﬂow of skilled workers to the labour market are needed to keep
relative wages constant. The inﬂow of skilled workers to the labour market needs to increase
from 35% of each birth cohort (the current inﬂow rate) to about 45% to 50% of each birth
cohort. Secondly, the price-elasticity of enrolment is likely to be low. Consequently, very large
subsidies are needed to boost the supply of skilled workers. Thirdly, there are potentially
important factors that undermine the effectiveness of education subsidies in reducing wage
inequality. These factors are: i) Education subsidies loose their potency to affect the income
distribution under free trade; ii) By stimulating the supply of skilled labour, education subsidies
may accelerate the rate of skill-biased technological change; iii) Trends in the overall economy
seem to hint at the direction of the ‘worst case’ scenario: internationalisation and increased trade
with low wage countries, more capital intensive production, and the upcoming of ICT related
technological changes; iv) Education subsidies have an highly unequal incidence, which may
off-set the gain in equality from changes in relative wages.
The challenge for the future is to design policies that are potentially more effective in
37boosting the supply of skills or to reduce income inequality more directly. Heckman (2003)
convincingly argues that emphasis in education policy should be placed on the early stages of the
life-cycle and on non-cognitive skills. Furthermore, more direct instruments like progressive
income taxes are potentially better suited in reducing income inequality than indirect instruments
such as education subsidies. Indeed, Saez (2003) has shown that under relatively mild conditions
the government should refrain from distorting relative wages for redistributional purposes and
should carry out all redistributions of income through the tax system.
38Appendix
A tilde (‘~’) denotes a log-linear deviation from an initial equilibrium. Linearising the ﬁrst order
condition for wages yields:
˜ π = ˜ S+ ˜ FG− ˜ FL+ ˜ GH.
We use the various properties of linear homogenous functions to determine each of the parts of
the equation above, see also Heijdra and Van der Ploeg (2002, Ch.4). First of all, the ﬁrst
derivatives are homogeneous of degree zero:
GFGG = −LFLG, LFLL = −GFLG,
SHGHH = −KGKG, KGKK = −SHGKG.








Thirdly, we deﬁne the shares of low-skilled labour and the composite function G in output, the
shares of skilled labour and capital in the composite function G, and the income shares of skilled














, ωGH +ωGK = 1,
ωH ≡ ωGωGH, ωK ≡ ωGωGK, ωL+ωH +ωK = 1.
Fourthly, we apply Euler’s rule:
˜ G = ωGH
 ˜ S+ ˜ H

+ωGK ˜ K.
Fifthly, we use the properties and deﬁnitions to derive:











˜ K− ˜ S− ˜ H

.
Finally, we substitute the last three results in the linearised equation for inequality and obtain the
equation in the text.
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